ascription as a standard by achievement, and associated with this a replacement of functional diffuseness by functional specificity and particularism by universalism'.
In addition to economists and sociologists, political scientists contributed significantly to modernisation theory. Among the most influential contributions in the early phase of the modernisation approach was an edited volume by Almond and Coleman (1960) on the politics of the developing areas. The volume started from the functions performed by structures in political systems 'in all societies regardless of scale, degree of differentiation, and culture' (Almond, 1960: 5) . The functional categories distinguished by Almond (1960: 17) included four input functions (political socialisation and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation and political communication) and three output functions (rule-making, rule application and rule adjudication). This approach to political modernisation assumes that a single political structure -such as a ruler, a legislature or a bureaucracy -can perform multiple functions. Yet, the approach argues that 'modern' political systems are characterised by structural differentiation or specialisation, implying that political structures are increasingly seen to perform only a single function:
What we mean when we speak of modern systems as being specialized is that certain structures emerge which have a functional distinctiveness, and which tend to perform what we may call a regulatory role in relation to that function within the political system as a whole. … What is peculiar to modern political systems is a relatively high degree of structural differentiation (i.e., the emergence of legislatures, political executives, bureaucracies, courts, electoral systems, parties, interest groups, media of communication), with each structure tending to perform a regulatory role for that function within the political systems as a whole. (Almond, 1960: 18) .
Authors contributing to a second wave of modernisation theory, the beginning of which is usually dated in the second half of the 1960s, were, in Higgott's (1983: 18) assessment, overall less optimistic about the prospects for progress and democracy than modernisation theorists in the first half of the decade. Samuel Huntington's work on political order was the prime example of the emergent concern with political stability. Huntington focused on the existence of a 'political gap' between more and less developed countries in terms of the level of political institutionalisation, in parallel to the more evident difference in levels of economic development. According to him, political violence and instability 'was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions' (Huntington, 1968: 4) . In Huntington's view, many developing countries experience a growing problem of political institutionalisation as a result of contrary movements of social mobilisation and economic development. Social mobilisation -'a change in the attitudes, values and expectations of people from those associated with the traditional world to those common to the modern world' (Huntington, 1968: 38) -leads to wants and aspirations among developing country populations that cannot be satisfied given the level of economic development. The frustration that is induced by the growing disparity between social mobilisation and economic possibilities leads to increased pressure on the political system to deliver, in the form of enhanced political participation. The strength of political institutions is key to dealing with this pressure: in Huntington's interpretation, political systems that are more successful in developing strong institutions can deal better with the increasing pressure generated by political participation and will turn out to be more stable. Political instability is likely to emerge when political institutions are not able to cope with increased participation (Huntington, 1968: 78-92) .
Modernisation theory came under increasing attack in the second half of the 1960s. Apart from the criticism targeted at the approach's ethnocentrism that was signalled above, critics increasingly pointed at the neglect of influences deriving from the role and position of developing countries in the international system. Analysts of economic underdevelopment of countries in Latin America, in particular, referred to the impact of colonialism and economic dependence on the United States as major sources of distorted development. The analysis of underdevelopment and dependence gave rise to a an understanding of development that was generalised in dependency theory, the second classical approach to development that is discussed in this chapter.
The dependency approach
In a similar way as the modernisation approach was inspired by nineteenth-and earlytwentieth-century social theorists who focused on the roots of European social and economic modernity, many dependency theorists continued the radical tradition that was set in by Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses of capitalism and imperialism in the same epoch. Central ideas derived by dependency (and later by world-system) theory from the (neo-)Marxist tradition concern the imperative of capital accumulation as an element of the capitalist political-economic order, and the inherently exploitative nature of relations of production Dependency theory originated in the Latin America of the 1960s, and built on earlier structuralist work on development pioneered by Raúl Prebisch and others in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Kay 2011: 117) .
As analysed by Kay (2011: 117-118) The reformist position was epitomised in Cardoso's (1972) analysis of dependent capitalist development and Cardoso and Faletto's (1979) seminal work on dependency and development in Latin America. The analysis put forward in these reformist works focused on the change in the nature of dependency, away from the simple exchange of primary products for manufactured ones, to a situation in which industrial production for the market in Latin America became more important. There would be a continuation of dependency, as in Cardoso's words: in spite of internal economic development, countries tied to international capitalism by that type of linkage remain economically dependent, insofar as the production of the means of production (technology) are concentrated in advanced capitalist economies (mainly in the US). … Some degree of local prosperity is possible insofar as consumption goods locally produced by foreign investments can induce some dynamic effects in the dependent economies. But at the same time, the global process of capitalist development determines an interconnection between the sector of production of consumption goods and the capital goods sector, reproducing in this way the links of dependency. (Cardoso, 1972: 90-91) A key element in this work is the notion that dependency cannot be understood solely as a characteristic of the external environment of developing countries, but that the internal dynamics needs to receive equal attention for understanding the historical dynamics of 7 relations between countries from the centre and those in the periphery: Cardoso and Faletto (1979: xvi) place emphasis on the importance of understanding 'the social practices of local groups and classes which try to enforce foreign interests, not precisely because they are foreign, but because they may coincide with values and interests that these groups pretend are their own'.
The dominant position within the dependency approach has undoubtedly been the Marxistinspired interpretation, which emphasised the impact of the outward-oriented nature of developing countries. Within the Marxist tradition of dependency, Andre Gunder Frank became a leading figure, emphasising the 'development of underdevelopment'. Frank's work is built on the difference between the experience of Western and developing countries -this is reflected in his famous formulation, 'The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped' (Frank 1969:4) .
Andre Gunder Frank (1969: 9) analysed development and underdevelopment as 'opposite sides of the same coin', as the outcome of the history of the capitalist world system. According to Frank, the driving force of global capitalism has always been exploitation: of the working class by the capital owners, and of the countries of the periphery by those in the centre. The bourgeoisie in peripheral countries share in the benefits of exploitation of their own population through their links to the centre, but is essentially a 'lumpenbourgeoisie' that is fully dependent on forces in the centre of the world system (Frank 1972: 13-14) .
In Frank's analysis, the capitalist world system, which originated in the fifteenth century, revolves around the logic of capital accumulation. Through unequal trade, investment and labour relations, the centre has been able to syphon off economic surpluses from the periphery. The main mechanisms of surplus extraction have changed over the history of capitalism. The classical colonial relationship between the centre and the periphery concerned trade in raw materials produced by the colonies for manufactured goods produced by the colonial powers of Europe (Frank, 1979: 103-110) . Next to this, investments have been a second means of surplus extraction: capital owners ensure that the benefits of the investments flow back to the centres of capitalism, which implies that the benefits for the periphery are minimal (Frank, 1979: 189-199) . Labour has been incorporated into the production process at adverse terms throughout the history of capitalism. Various forms of forced labour, including slavery during the first few centuries of capitalist history, were succeeded by proletarianisation and informalisation of labour in different parts of the world (Frank, 1979: 160-171).
In similar ways as Andre Gunder Frank but with different emphases, Egyptian-born Samir Amin (1974) analysed issues of dependence and (under)development in terms of 'accumulation on a world scale'. In his view, the expansion of capitalism over the past five centuries has been the consequence of falling rates of profit in the centre of the capitalist world system. The centre and periphery of the capitalist system are linked through mechanisms of 'unequal exchange' of different types of commodities, while those mechanisms are based on the unequal remuneration of labour in the various parts of the system (Amin, 1974: 62-63) . In Amin's view, unequal exchange leads to a transfer of value from the periphery to the centre in the form of undervalued commodities and manufactured goods 'traded' between both poles of the system. Underdevelopment in the periphery is manifested in three main structural features (Amin, 1974: 262-299) : the existence of extreme disparities in productivity across sectors in the periphery; the absence of linkages ('disarticulation') among productive sectors in the periphery and, instead of these, the outward orientation to meet demands from the centre; and the highly unequal international division of labour, reflected in 'unequal specialisation' and the periphery's dependence on foreign capital.
Frank and Amin reached similar conclusions from their analysis for the political strategies of developing countries. The notion of 'dissociation' of developing countries from the world system that Frank (1984: 215-229) proposed closely resembled Amin's (1987; 1990) ideas of 'delinking'. Amin's proposal to delink developing countries from the world system derived from his understanding that development policies can only be beneficial for developing countries if they are truly 'autocentric'. Developing countries' export orientation would need to be reversed and instead of producing mainly primary products for world markets, they should steer their economies toward the production of goods for consumption and capital goods (Amin, 1990: 18-19) . The proposal for delinking involved a political programme, as 'delinking, whether one likes it or not, is associated with a "transition" -outside capitalism and over a long time -towards socialism' (Amin, 1990: 55) .
Since the early 1970s, world-system 3 theory started to emerge in an attempt by Immanuel
Wallerstein and several dependency theorists to develop a social-scientific interpretation of the history of the capitalist world-system. The world-system approach gradually occupied the place of dependency theory. Wallerstein's historical-sociological interpretation of the rise and expansion of the capitalist world-economy since the 'long sixteenth century ' (1450-1600) revolves around the notion of the single division of labour.
According to Wallerstein, the focus of theories of long-term development should not be on societies or polities, but rather on 'social systems'. As he phrased it himself, 'My own unit of analysis is based on the measurable social reality of interdependent productive activities, what may be called an "effective social division of labor" or, in code language, an "economy"' (Wallerstein, 1984: 2) . The history of the capitalist world-economy, in
Wallerstein's view, is the history of the expansion of the global division of labour, which has integrated all parts of the world and reached its peak in the period of neoliberal globalisation (Wallerstein, 2000) . Capital accumulation has always been the main drive of capitalists worldwide, and the main political strategy to continue the deepening of this process has been 'the relocation of given sectors of production to other zones of the world economy that are, on the average, lower-wage areas' (Wallerstein, 2000: 261) .
The history of the modern world-system, which has been a capitalist world-economy, has seen the decline of accumulation mechanisms other than the production for (world) markets.
Politically, the world-economy has been able to survive despite the fundamental contradictions and tensions among social groups thanks to the fact that the global division of labour was never controlled by one political entity -which would, in Wallerstein's words, have turned the world-economy into a world-empire (Wallerstein, 1974: 347-348 ). An important element in the political organisation of the modern world-system has been the middle tier of areas between the core and the periphery: the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery, which is 'both exploited and exploiter' (Wallerstein, 1979: 23) , is understood in terms of its middle position in relation to such features as the capital intensity of production, the mode of labour control and the strength of the state. The role of the semiperiphery is seen mainly in political terms, in that it consists of 'middle areas [that] partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily located in peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core-states and the groups which operate within and through their state machineries' (Wallerstein, 1974: 350) .
Throughout their history, dependency and world-system theories have been criticised for their emphasis on the material and economic dimensions of their explanatory model, as well as for the seemingly deterministic nature of the explanations of development processes. Other approaches, such as post-colonial theory and post-structuralism, have been formulated by scholars who have an affinity with the radical criticism of dependency but stress other dimensions of development, such as culture and identity issues.
Contemporary manifestations of the modernisation approach
The criticism aimed at modernisation theory since the second half of the 1960s did diminish the appeal of this approach to development, but has not led to its complete demise. Although the heydays of modernisation theory are long past, many scholars have remained inspired by notions that were brought forward as part of the theorisation of modernity and tradition. In most cases, the ideas of modernisation theory were not followed uncritically, so that more (Inglehart, 1971: 994-996 ). Inglehart concluded that the embrace of post-materialist issues by certain, newer political parties would likely lead to a 'silent revolution' in advanced democracies, as the changed preferences of younger groups of voters would strengthen the post-materialist parties and erode the support base of traditional parties (Inglehart, 1971 (Inglehart, : 1009 (Inglehart, -1013 . In later work, based on the World Values Surveys, Inglehart (1997: 4) argued that the shift from materialist to post-materialist values was only one element of a broader cultural change, involving a range of orientations from religious beliefs to sexual norms. The inspiration he has taken from modernisation theory becomes clear in his position that '[e]conomic development, cultural change, and political change go together in coherent and roughly predictable patterns' (Inglehart, 1997: 324) .
In an attempt to broaden the analysis of modernisation and cultural change into 'new modernisation', Inglehart and Welzel (2009: 36) argued that democracy is the expected outcome of processes of social and economic modernisation. Focusing on modernisation as 'a syndrome of social changes linked to industrialization' (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009: 34) , they posited that 'economic development brings social and political changes only when it changes people's behavior. Consequently, economic development is conducive to democracy to the extent that it, first, creates a large, educated, and articulate middle class of people who are accustomed to thinking for themselves and, second, transforms people's values and motivations' (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009: 42-43 ).
In his work on the impact of globalisation, sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt has tried to come to grips with the nature of modernity in contemporary society. Taking issue with the position that modernisation would be akin to Westernisation, Eisenstadt (2002: 2-3) argued that 'Western patterns of modernity are not the only "authentic" modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be a basic reference point for others'. According to Eisenstadt, the 'programme of modernity' consists of cultural, political and identity-related elements. The cultural dimension of modernity relates to ideas that human beings can shape their future through 'autonomous human agency' (Eisenstadt, 2002: 3) and are not limited in their action by traditional political and cultural relations of authority. The political element consists of the demise of traditional ways to legitimise the political order. The identity dimension of modernity is linked to the tendency to adopt more universalistic definitions of identity and collectivity.
Eisenstadt argued that modernity has taken different shapes in various parts of the world, among others under the influence of social movements (Eisenstadt, 2002: 9-12) . As a result variants of modernity co-exist, and frequently conflict with each other. In particular, 'the encounter of modernity with non-Western societies brought about far-reaching transformations in the premises, symbols and institutions of modernity' (Eisenstadt, 2002: 14) . The result of this development, according to Eisenstadt, was that multiple modernities have come into existence: these are modernities that share the elements of the abovementioned programme, but start from radically different values and therefore privilege contrasting political, cultural and social ordering principles. Referring to fundamentalist movements, Eisenstadt argued that these should often not be seen as traditionalist. Rather, 'the distinct visions of fundamentalist movements have been formulated in terms common to the discourse of modernity; they have attempted to appropriate modernity on their own terms' (Eisenstadt, 2002: 18) . For North et al. (2009: 18-21, 30-41) , the natural state is characterised by the possession of special privileges, notably access to economic rents, by a dominant coalition of elites.
Violence among the elites is limited because they know that the organisations they are using for the extraction of rents from land, labour and capital all depend on the support of the state.
The balance among the elites is inherently fragile, since external shocks or the unintended consequences of agreed policies may lead to distortions of the balance among interests and hence infighting among elites. Open access orders are understood as orders where, in a Weberian sense, the state has the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and economic and social relations are no longer personalistic but become 'impersonal' (North et al., 2009: 21-25, 112-117) . Open access orders are the result of a 'transition', which can take place when elites 'find a common interest in transforming some elite privileges into impersonal elite rights shared by all members of the elite' (North et al., 2009: 190 to an open access order: the creation of a rule of law for elites, the opportunity to establish stable impersonal organisation, and control of the military (North et al., 2009: 26, 154-181) .
Contemporary manifestations of the dependency and world-system approach
On a similar note as was made above on the modernisation approach, the fact that the writings of dependency and world-system scholars were criticised did not result in the disappearance of the approach. Contemporary research reflecting the dependency and worldsystem approach is still very visible. 4 The global financial crisis even seems to have resulted Castells and Laserna (1989: 536) , the application of information technologies in production processes, coupled with the dynamics of economic globalisation and socio-economic restructuring in the core and periphery have produced new forms of dependency. Technological dependency has, in their view, had major impacts on the countries in the global South, such as those in Latin
America. According to Castells and Laserna (1989: 539) , ' [w]ithout a minimum level of endogenous productive capacity in hightechnology capital goods, countries must import almost all the new productive machinery in a period of rapid technological change'.
Importation of sophisticated technology requires increased exports of manufactured goods, particularly those with lower technological content -and this produces a 'new unequal exchange in the international economy … between goods and services with different technological components' (Castells and Laserna, 1989: 540) .
Notions of unequal specialisation have also been traditional concerns related to the notion of global commodity chains that was pioneered by scholars working in the world-system tradition. 5 In the original use of the term by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986: 159) , '[t] he concept "commodity chain" refers to a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity. In building this chain we start with the final production operation and move sequentially backward ... until one reaches primarily raw material inputs.' A 2014 special issue of the Journal of World-Systems Research has provided an assessment of the political economy of commodity chains, more in particular of 'the way in which commodity chain analysis can be mobilized to illuminate the contours, composition, and character of the modern world-system' (Bair, 2014: 2). The contributors analyse a range of contemporary issues related to the functioning of commodity chains, from the impact of inter-state rivalry between the US and China on the governance of the transnational cotton commodity chain to gendered divisions of labour in the commodity chain, and the value generated in the production and marketing of iPads by Apple.
Amy Quark (2014) argues, in relation to the example of the transnational commodity chain of cotton, that the divide between state governance and private-sector governance is much less pronounced than often pretended. The US-dominated cotton industry attempted, together with US government agencies, to withstand the challenges to US hegemony in setting standards for cotton production: according to this analysis, the US government with transnational firms tried 'to persuade others involved in the transnational cotton trade around the world to support their governance arrangements before the Chinese state and textile manufacturers in China developed the scientific, technological and institutional capacities to launch their own hegemony-building campaign, which would be backed by the coercive system (in global governance, inequality and democracy, the biosphere, the global capitalist system and the global left) as the outcome of the dialectics related to the sequence of hegemonies in the system. He argues that the U.S. hegemony -understood as the political and economic preponderance of a great power -has been on the decline for several decades.
In his view, the interconnections among the crises are likely to result in a 'new stage of capitalism' (Chase-Dunn, 2013: 179) . According to Sassen (2013) , the crisis of capitalism has resulted in the 'expulsion' of people from the economy in large parts of the world. In her view, the deepening of global capitalism -which has replaced earlier waves of expansion into new parts of the world -requires the natural resources of large parts of the developing world, rather than their populations. These populations are increasingly expelled to the urban areas or, as migrants, to other countries, and they end up as underclasses (Sassen, 2013: 199) .
Other continuing elements in the world-system approach -resistance and repression -are presented by Reifer (2013) and Robinson (2013) (Reifer, 2013: 187) . Repression is, according to Robinson (2013: 193) , an evitable outcome of the current crisis of capitalism given 'transitions from social welfare to social control states around the world'. Overaccumulation and rising inequalities within and across societies have resulted in increased polarisation, which may no longer be governable by consensual policy making and hence may require the 'policing' of global capitalism (Robinson, 2013: 196) .
Concluding remarks
This chapter has described modernisation and dependency theory as the two most important classical approaches to development. The approaches have evolved since the 1950s and 1960s as anchor points in the debate on how to best understand international development processes. The distinction made by modernisation theorists between 'traditional' and 'modern' forms of society, politics and the economy led to analyses of the circumstances and policies that were supposed to lead countries on the path to higher levels of development.
Dependency theory's focus on the long-term historical processes that were locking in the progress in the countries of the global South produced analyses of the impact of colonialism and the persistent forms of neo-imperialist exploitation that characterise the contemporary international political economy.
Modernisation and dependency theories both were the subject of profound criticism, directed at their core messages. The modernisation approach was attacked because of its tendency to treat the Western experience as benchmark for developments in other parts of the world. The ethnocentric character of its analyses and recommendations led to a declining interest in modernisation theory among development scholars. In a similar way, dependency theory was criticised because of its perceived deterministic character, which was felt to overemphasise the barriers for developing countries in achieving a meaningful level of development.
The observed weaknesses of modernisation and dependency theories have not resulted in the complete disappearance of the research programmes they formulated four or five decades ago. While its coverage of the literature has necessarily been limited, this chapter has argued that many scholars have remained inspired by the intellectual agenda of the modernisation and dependency approach. In important ways, contemporary analysts of development have distanced themselves from the early tenets of the two approaches, which are seen either as too dogmatic or simplistic. Although it is generally critical of unilinear thinking, current research on such diverse issues as democratisation (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2009 ), globalisation and modernity (Eisenstadt, 2002) , anti-Westernism (Buruma and Margalit, 2004 ) and long-term socio-economic transformation (North et al., 2009) shows the influence of a generic modernisation paradigm. In a similar way, the criticism of dependency theory's determinism is embraced by contemporary world-system analysts. Yet, adherents of worldsystem analysis who study issues such as technological change (Castells and Laserna, 1989) , the nature of international commodity or value chains (Clelland, 2014; Dunaway, 2014; Quark, 2014) or the crisis-ridden character of contemporary society (Chase-Dunn, 2013; Reifer, 2013 , Robinson, 2013 Sassen, 2013) continue to be inspired by a materialist worldview that places the persistence and reproduction of inequalities centrally. Princeton University Press): 3-64.
